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2 Executing a U-Turn: Withdrawal and Secondary Party Liability Following Ahsin v R 
This article analyses the conceptual nature of withdrawal from secondary participation 
in crime under section 66 of the Crimes Act 1961. The majority in Ahsin v R held the 
recognition of withdrawal must be as a ‘true’ defence, and was unable to negate the 
elements of s 66 because it could not undo the completed actus reus at the point of 
participation. This required the majority to clarify or alter the legal elements of section 
66, which then indicate the derivative basis of s 66 liability to be on an association of the 
secondary party to the principal. This view is questionable in light of underlying 
principles of secondary liability and criminal law generally. This article advocates that in 
order to establish sufficient moral culpability and fault, some connection from the 
secondary party to the offence should be required. This connection can be broken if the 
secondary party fully neutralises his participation before the offence is committed. 
Withdrawal would therefore be able negate the elements of the offence. Policy reasons 
may have motivated the majority to reject this conclusion, however this approach is 
arguably more consistent with secondary party liability in New Zealand and in other 
jurisdictions. 
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4 Executing a U-Turn: Withdrawal and Secondary Party Liability Following Ahsin v R 
I Introduction 
The New Zealand Supreme Court in Ahsin v R by a majority of McGrath, 
Glazebrook, and Tipping JJ held that the true conceptual nature of withdrawal from 
secondary participation in a crime was a ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ defence to liability under s 
66 of the Crimes Act 1961.1 They rejected the view of the minority, comprised of Elias 
CJ and William Young J, that acts of withdrawal could negate the elements of the 
offence.2 Under an authentic defence, the evidentiary onus rests on the defendant during 
trial to make withdrawal a live issue.3 Conversely, the minority’s view would impose a 
burden on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had not 
withdrawn.4 
 
The timing of liability of a secondary party relative to the principal offender dictated 
the conceptualisation of withdrawal by both the majority and the minority. The majority 
denied that withdrawal could negate the elements of s 66, as the actus reus of s 66(1) was 
complete when the acts of assistance or encouragement occurred.5 Similarly under s 
66(2), the actus reus was complete when a common purpose was established between the 
secondary party and the principal.6 As observed by William Young J, “the majority, by 
treating withdrawal as irrelevant to the actus reus of party liability, creates space for the 
operation of the common law defence of withdrawal which they adopt.”7  
 
The majority held that the actus reus is completed when the secondary party provides 
their assistance or encouragement and in doing so, clarifies or alters the elements of s 66. 
Under s 66(1), the legal element of actual assistance can occur or be confirmed before the 
commission of the offence, hence indicating that the assistance can expire. Under s 66(2), 
the principal needs to commit the crime in prosecution of the common purpose, but that 
  
1 Ahsin v R [2014] NZSC 153, [2015] 1 NZLR 493, at [116]-[118] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping 
JJ. 
2 See at [20]-[21] per Elias CJ dissenting, and at [254] per William Young J dissenting. 
3 At [120] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
4 At [253] per William Young J dissenting. 
5 At [116] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
6 At [117] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
7 At [252] per William Young J dissenting. 
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common purpose is not required to be current between the parties at the point in time the 
crime is committed. As a result the majority’s reasoning implies that the derivative nature 
of secondary liability is based on association to the principal.  
In contrast, precedent and authority indicates the manifestation of the derivative 
nature of s 66 is some connection to the offence through a continuing connection between 
the secondary party and the principal’s offence under s 66(1), or a common purpose that 
is current between the parties at the time the principal commits the offence under s 66(2).  
 
The minority carefully analysed the requirements of s 66,8 and concluded that a 
continuing connection must be made from the secondary party’s initial participatory 
action to the principal’s offence under s 66(1), and the common purpose must be current 
between the parties at the time of the commission of the principal’s offence under s 
66(2).9 This is consistent with precedent and authority that indicates something more than 
mere association is required for liabitliy to derive. Withdrawal can occur in the window 
of time between the secondary party’s initial participatory action and the commission of 
the offence by the principal offender under both s 66(1) and (2). Conversely, acts of 
withdrawal at the same time as the principal offence generally will not prevent 
conviction.10 The minority also considered that the majority’s authentic defence is 
inconsistent with s20 of the Crimes Act 1961.11 
 
II The Conceptualisation of Withdrawal is Determined by the Timing of 
Secondary Party Liability  
 Section 66 prescribes the statutory structure of secondary liability.12 The liability of a 
secondary party derives from an offence committed by a principal offender by satisfying 
  
8 Ahsin, above n 1, at [246] and [248] per William Young J dissenting. 
9 At [244], [246] and [248] per William Young J dissenting. 
10 R v Witika [1993] 2 NZLR 424, (1992) 9 CRNZ 272 (CA). See also Peter Gillies The Law of Criminal 
Complicity (Law Book Company, Sydney, 1980) at 176. See also discussion in KJM Smith “Withdrawal in 
Complicity: A Restatement of Principles” [2001] Crim LR 769 at 778-779; AP Simester and WJ 
Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2012) at 6.6.6. 
11 Ahsin, above n 1, at [255]-[269] per William Young J dissenting. 
12 Crimes Act 1961. 
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the legal elements s 66.13 Section 66(1)(b)-(d) describes that a party who aided, abetted, 
incited, counselled, or procured an offence is equally liable with the principal who 
actually committed the offence. Section 66(2) describes that where two people form a 
common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose, both will be liable for the offence 
encompassed in the unlawful purpose, and any collateral offences foreseen as a probable 
consequence of pursuing the common purpose.14 The secondary party’s involvement 
must occur before or during the commission of the principal offence.15 If the assistance 
occurs after the offence is complete, the accused will be considered an accessory after the 
fact, rather than a secondary party.16  
 
During the majority’s conceptualisation of withdrawal, they assessed when the actus 
reus of party liability is complete.17 This is essentially conditional liability, as the mens 
rea must also occur at the time of assistance,18 yet liability is conditional on the 
successful commission of the offence by the principal.19 Unconditional liability attaches 
upon the completion of the principal’s offence.20 For simplicity ‘conditional liability’, 
will hereby be referenced simply as ‘liability’. The distinction of unconditional and 
conditional secondary liability has no impact to the conceptualisation of withdrawal. The 
majority hold that upon the confirmation of conditional liability, the secondary party is 
unable to withdraw. The minority would not consider conditional liability to exist in 
these circumstances; liability remains inchoate until the commission of the principal’s 
offence.21 The main focus is determining when the secondary party is in a position where 
they cannot undo their actions. 
 
  
13 Crimes Act, s 66(1)(a). See Simester and Brookbanks, above n 10, at 6.1. 
14 Ahsin, above n 1, at [102](a)-(e) per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
15 Larkins v Police [1987] 2 NZLR 282, (1987) 3 CRNZ 49; Gillies, above n 10, at 51; Simester and 
Brookbanks, above n 10, at 6.1-6.2. 
16 Crimes Act, s71. 
17 Ahsin, above n 1, at [116]-[117] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
18 David Ormerod Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 
8.4.2. 
19 See Ahsin, above n 1, at [20] per Elias CJ  dissenting. 
20 At [113] per per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
21 Ahsin, above n 1, at [21] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
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The majority and Elias CJ constructed a framework, using the legal elements of s 66, 
to analyse when the secondary party’s liability was complete.22 This dictated whether 
withdrawal was able to affect the participation already given. The relationship of the 
various legal concepts is demonstrated in the diagram: 
 
Hence, the legal elements of s 66 established the timing of liability. In doing so, the 
timing of liability is used to conceptualise withdrawal. If secondary party liability 
attaches when the act of assistance occurs, withdrawal must be an authentic defence to 
the already completed actus reus.23 If liability attaches when the principal commits the 
offence, acts of withdrawal could negate the secondary party’s involvement.24 Exactly 
what type of acts that are required to successfully negate the elements of the offence 
would depend on the type of the secondary party’s acts; mere encouragement could be 
countermanded by a clear declaration of dissent. In some cases it may be impossible to 
negate the elements of the offence; for example where the secondary party has provided 
the code to a safe.  
 
III Analysing the Elements of s 66(1) and their Effect on Withdrawal 
The legal elements of s 66(1) indicate the timing of secondary liability. Section 66(1) 
requires: 
66 Parties to offences 
(1) Every one is a party to and guilty of an offence who— 
(a) … 
(b) does or omits an act for the purpose of aiding any person to commit the 
offence; or 
(c) abets any person in the commission of the offence; or 
(d) incites, counsels, or procures any person to commit the offence. 
  
22 Contrast Smith, above n 10. See also CMV Clarkson, HM Keating and SR Cunningham Clarkson and 
Keating Criminal Law: Text and Materials (6th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007) at 579. 
23 Ahsin, above n 1, at [116]-[117] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
24 At [21] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
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Aiding, more commonly known as assistance, under s 66(1)(b) will be the focus of the 
following analysis, but also applies to encouraging under s 66(1)(c). 
A Elements of s 66(1)(b) Liability as Explained by the Majority and Minority 
The legal elements of s 66(1)(b) are: the principal must commit the primary offence 
from which liability is derived; the secondary party must have assisted the principal 
offender in that crime; the secondary party intended to assist in that offence; and the 
secondary party knew the essential facts of the offence.25 
 
In light of the second element, s 66(1)(b) requires “an act done for the purpose of 
aiding.”26 On a strict interpretation, the secondary party does not in fact need to assist the 
principal in the commission of the crime.27 However, Larkins v Police affirmed the 
principal must be actually assisted in the commission of the offence, thereby establishing 
that s 66 liability is not inchoate.28  
1 The construction of liability by the majority 
The majority creates a construction of liability featuring ‘actual assistance’ during 
their discussion of withdrawal:29  
“[A]lthough s 66(1) requires proof that the defendant has in fact aided or encouraged 
the principal offender, s 66(1) does not stipulate a requirement that the assistance or 
encouragement provided remain operative, whatever that concept may entail, at the 
time the offence is committed by the principal. On the language of s 66(1)(b), (c), 
and (d), the actus reus is complete when the actual assistance or encouragement, 
counsel, procurement or incitement occurs provided the principal offender 
subsequently commits the relevant offence. On this approach, the completed actus 
reus is not negated by subsequent acts of withdrawal.” 
As seen in the diagram below, the secondary party’s actus reus (SP actus reus), or 
[conditional] liability, is complete upon the act of assistance.30 The Crown is not required 
  
25 Ahsin, above n 1, at [83](a)-(d) per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
26 Crimes Act, s 66(1)(b). 
27 See Larkins, above n 15, at 288; Ahsin, above n 1, at [116] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
28 Larkins, above n 15, at 290; Ahsin, above n 1, at [83](b), n 55, and [116] per McGrath, Glazebrook and 
Tipping JJ and at [246] per William Young J dissenting. 
29 Ahsin, above n 1, at [116] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
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to show any continuing connection between the assistance and the eventual offence. 
However liability still derives from the principal’s offence (PO actus reus).31 The 
secondary party’s assistance forms the actus reus instantaneously, only dependent on the 
principal committing the relevant offence. Withdrawal is unable to negate the elements of 
the offence. 
 
Diagram of the majority’s construction of s 66(1) liability by assistance 
 
2 The construction of liability by the minority 
The minority took a complicated approach.32 The secondary party’s actus reus is not 
complete until actual assistance is proven at the time of the offence.33 A continuing 
connection, manifested by actual assistance, must be made from the secondary party’s 
participation and the offence.34 The time gap between the assistance and the commission 
of the crime provides the secondary party an opportunity to stop his actions from actually 
assisting the offender,35 i.e. the secondary party is able to break his connection to the 
offence. The fulfilment of liability is therefore precluded until actual assistance is 
                                                                                                                                            
30 Ahsin, above n 1, at [116] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
31 At [244](b) per William Young J dissenting. 
32 At [20]-[21] per Elias CJ and [245]-[247] per William Young J dissenting. 
33 At [21] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
34 At [244](b) and [245] per William Young J dissenting. 
35 At [251] per William Young J dissenting. 
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confirmed at the time of the offence.36 Withdrawal between the participation and 
principal’s offence is able to negate the elements of the offence.  
 
Diagram of the minority’s construction of s 66(1) liability by assistance 
 
 
Under the reasoning of both the majority and the minority, no further secondary party 
involvement is required following the initial assistance to satisfy liability. The key 
difference is the majority consider that [conditional] liability attaches upon the act of 
assistance, while the minority, despite the assistance completed earlier, do not consider 
liability can attach until actual assistance is confirmed at the time the offence was 
committed. The crux of the s 66(1)(b) debate is the definition of actual assistance and its 
impact on the timing of the secondary party’s liability relative to the principal’s offence.   
B Defining ‘Actual Assistance’ According to Precedent and Authority 
Terminology such as “a real assistance”37, “effect of aiding”38 and “the actual effect 
[of the assistance]”39 was used in Larkins to describe actual assistance. The requirement 
  
36 At [21] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
37 Larkins, above n 15, at 288. 
38 At 288. See also Hewit v Police HC Hamilton AP83/00, 9 October 2000 at [35]. 
39 Larkins, above n 15; Attorney-General v Able [1984] 1 QB 795 (CA). 
11 Executing a U-Turn: Withdrawal and Secondary Party Liability Following Ahsin v R 
of ‘actual assistance’ has not had extensive discussion, yet actual assistance is not 
required to make a substantial or material difference to the offence.40 Larkins held that if 
abetting requires actual encouragement, s 66(1)(b) should require actual assistance.41 
Actual assistance should therefore be considered in light of R v Schriek,42 where the judge 
was considering the requirements of actual encouragement. He held that at one bound a 
causal connection is not required, while some connection between the encourager and the 
principal must be established.43 He expressly omitted to construct an exhaustive 
definition of the ‘middle ground’, implying that more than some connection to the 
principal himself is required.44 This middle ground is likely some connection from the 
secondary party (and his encouragement) to the offence itself. The Schriek connection has 
also been directly linked with assistance under s 66(1)(b) in case law.45  Despite 
contention surrounding the derivative nature of secondary liability,46 New Zealand 
authority establishes that s 66(1) derives liability from the principal’s offence, hence the 
secondary party’s conduct must somehow be connected to the offence by the principal.47 
For avoidance of doubt, a causative link for assistance or encouragement is not 
required,48 and the principal can be unaware of the secondary party’s assistance.49 
 
Similarly in English and Canadian authority, a connection from the secondary 
party to the principal’s offence is necessary for secondary party liability. The equivalent 
  
40 Gillies, above n 10. See also KJM Smith “The Law Commission Consultation Paper on complicity: Part 
1: A blueprint for rationalism” (1994) Crim LR 239, at 245-247. 
41 Larkins, above n 15, at 290. 
42 Garrow and Turkington's Criminal Law in New Zealand (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [CRI66.4] 
and [CRI66.8(viii)]. 
43 R v Schriek (1997) 14 CRNZ 449 at 459.  
44 At 459. 
45 R v Zizov HC Auckland T031264, 7 April 2004. 
46 See Andrew Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) at 
10.6; See generally Law Commission Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law Com CP131, 1993). 
47 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 10, at 6.1 and 6.4.2. See also A P Simester and others Simester and 
Sullivan’s Criminal Law (5th ed, Hart, Oxford, 2013) at 213. 
48 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773 (CA); Simester and Brookbanks, above n 
10, at 6.4.2. See also Larkins, above n 15; Schriek, above n 43, at 459; Ormerod, above n 18, at 194; Card, 
Cross and Jones Criminal Law (20th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 17.17-17.18.  
49 Larkins, above n 15, at 287. See also R v Mendez [2010] EWCA Crim 516 at 23; Able, above n 39; R v 
Calhaem [1985] QB 808. 
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provision of assistance under the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (UK) requires actual 
assistance.50 Ormerod comments “there must be some link between D and P in the sense 
that D must have provided assistance or encouragement in fact.”51 In R v Mendez, the 
English Court of Appeal held that “in both Attorney-General v Able and R v Calhaem the 
court recognised that there must be a connecting link between D’s assistance or 
encouragement and P’s act…P’s act must be done within the scope of D’s authority or 
advice.”52 Card, Cross and Jones suggest that the secondary party’s actions must have had 
some relevance to the offence in that there must be some “connecting link”.53 R v Dooley, 
in the Ontario Court of Appeal, sets out that the necessary connection between the 
secondary party and the commission of the offence is any act before or during the 
commission of the offence that somehow assists or encourages the principal in the 
commission of the crime.54 The necessary connection is captured by the phrase ‘actual 
assistance’ or ‘assistance in fact’.55  
 
Upon these authorities, actual assistance is described to be real assistance or of 
some effect; it does not need to be substantial. Some connection must be made from the 
assistance to the offence itself. This connection is the same as the ‘continuing connection’ 
not required by the majority.56 Assistance under these authorities can only be confirmed 
to be of actual effect at the time of the principal’s offence.  
  
50 Ormerod, above n 18, at 191-192. 
51 Ormerod, above n 18, at 193. 
52 Mendez, above n 49, at [23]; Able, above n 39; R v Calhaem, above n 49. See also R v Stringer [2011] 
EWCA Crim 1396 at [48], and Law Commission Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007) at 2.33. 
53 Card, Cross and Jones, above n 46, at 17.18. See also R v Stringer above n 52, at [48]; Ormerod, above n 
18, at 191-192. 
54 R v Dooley 249 CCC (3d) 449, at [123]. Application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada 
refused in Dooley v R 276 OAC 396, and Dooley v R 276 OAC 397. Considered or followed by R v Truong 
2010 SKQB 127; R v Alcantara 2012 ABQB 521; R v Pavalaki 2013 BCSC 990; R v Vu 2015 BCSC 1073. 
55 R v Dooley, above n 54, at [123]. 
56 Ahsin, above n 1, at [244](b) per William Young J dissenting. 
13 Executing a U-Turn: Withdrawal and Secondary Party Liability Following Ahsin v R 
C ‘Actual Assistance’ Manifests the Derivative Nature of Secondary Liability  
Secondary party liability is derivative.57 Conviction of a secondary party is possible 
by attributing liability from an offence committed by another party to the secondary party 
by some method. In New Zealand, the derivative nature of liability under s 66(1)(b) is 
manifested by the requirement of actual assistance.58 This does not, however, identify the 
precise ‘link’ required to successfully pass liability to the secondary party. Below are five 
(non-exhaustive) categories on the possible legal conduct the secondary party must 
perform in order to derive liability from the principal:  
• [Category 1: Attempting to assist (Inchoate/non-derivative basis of liability) by 
providing assistance to a (potential) principal but the principal does not actually 
commit the offence; similar to inchoate incitement under s 311(2).59] 
• Category 2: Association of the secondary party to the principal offender, but of no 
effect to the offence itself.60  
• Category 3: Some Connection to the offence committed by the principal, by 
providing actual assistance of ‘some effect’ to the commission of the offence.61  
• Category 4: Substantial effect to the way the offence is committed (substantial, 
tangible or material difference to the commission of the offence.)62 
• Category 5: Causation; the participation of the secondary party caused the 
principal to commit the offence63 
The difficulty of the legal requirement in each category increases moving down the list. 
Conduct that satisfies a category will also satisfy those above. The definition of actual 
  
57 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 10, at 6.1. 
58 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 10, at 6.4.2. Contrast AP Simester “The mental element in 
complicity” (2006) 122 LQR 578. 
59 Law Commission, above n 48. 
60 See Ahsin, above n 1, at [116] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ; Graham Virgo “Joint Enterprise 
Liability is Dead: Long Live Accessorial Liability” (2012) Crim L R 850 at 860.  
61 See Ahsin v R, above n 1, at [20] per Elias CJ dissenting, at [246] per William Young J dissenting; R v 
Schriek, above n 43, at 459; Stringer, above n 52, at [48]; Simester and Brookbanks, above n 10, at 6.4.2; R 
v Dooley, above n 54, at [123]. 
62 American Law Institute’s Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal Code as discussed in Gillies, above 
n 10. 
63 See KJM Smith A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1991). 
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assistance proposed earlier would indicate that the required conduct to derive liability 
under s 66(1)(b) falls into category 3; to demonstrate actual assistance there must be some 
connection to the offence by the secondary party. 
D Defining ‘Actual Assistance’ in light of Ahsin v R 
1 The effect of not requiring the assistance to ‘remain operative’ on the definition of 
‘actual assistance’ 
The majority note that s 66(1) does not stipulate a requirement that the assistance 
‘remain operative’ in order to affect the nature of the assistance required to prevent the 
secondary party from negating their assistance.64 They omitted to define what ‘remain 
operative’ means and provided no accompanying authority on the phrase,65 but 
essentially this observation allowed the majority to assert that liability is formed upon the 
act of assistance.  The derivative nature of s 66 is manifested in requiring actual 
assistance.66 Therefore when the majority described the nature of actual assistance, they 
established the type of derivative link needed to establish secondary liability. In context 
of the categories set out above, they are performing a line drawing exercise to exclude 
categories with more stringent legal requirements.  In other words, defining what is and is 
not actual assistance dictates the way liability is derived. If the requirements of actual 
assistance are modified, then the way liability derives is also modified. Similarly, if the 
majority commented that liability was to derive by a precise type of link, the nature of 
actual assistance would need to reflect that precise link. They are interdependent 
concepts. 
2 Altering (or clarifying) ‘actual assistance’ 
The majority do not require a continuing connection between secondary party’s 
assistance and the offence.67 Therefore the derivative link described in category 3 (some 
  
64 Ahsin, above n 1, at [116] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
65 Compare Clifford v R [2012] NZCA 134 at [18]-[19]; R v Williams CA101/00, 31 July 2000 at [18]; and 
R v Atonio [2009] NZCA 359 at [33]. 
66 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 10, at 6.4.2. See also R v Dooley, above n 54, at [123]. 
67 Ahsin, above n 1, at [116] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ, and at [244](b) per William Young J 
dissenting. 
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connection) is not required to satisfy the secondary party’s liability. This clarification or 
alteration of the necessary derivative link would therefore suggest that ‘actual assistance’ 
was clarified or altered so that something less that ‘some connection’ needs to be proved.  
 
Elias CJ made observations regarding the necessity of the assistance to operate at the 
time of the offence. She notes that “[w]hether earlier-provided assistance or 
encouragement continues to operate at the time the offence is committed is intensely fact-
specific.”68 An element of liability is the existence of the assistance at the time of the 
offence.69 She substitutes the phrase ‘continues to operate’ with ‘existence’, and observes 
that “the Crown must exclude the view that any steps taken to remove encouragement or 
assistance mean that such encouragement or assistance no longer operated at the time the 
offence was committed.”70 Therefore in terms of the majority’s reasoning, assistance that 
does not “remain operative” is actual assistance that does not continue to and exist at the 
time of the offence; excluding a requirement of a continuing connection under category 3 
and implying some lower category is necessary to derive liability.71 
 
The wording of the majority suggests actual assistance can be satisfied when the 
assistance is provided; “the actus reus is complete when the actual assistance…occurs 
provided the principal offender subsequently commits the relevant offence.”72 The 
principal’s offence can be committed after the already completed actual assistance i.e. 
assistance that actually assists earlier, but is not required to at the time of the offence.73 
Therefore actual assistance has been clarified or modified so that the secondary party is 
able to assist the principal during the period of preparation before the crime, which would 
encompass any earlier provided assistance that may have expired by the time the offence 
was eventually committed.74 This clarification or alteration of actual assistance from the 
definition of actual assistance provided earlier seems consistent with s 66(1) and with the 
  
68 Ahsin, above n 1, at [20] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
69 At [20] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
70 At [21] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
71 At [244](b), per William Young J dissenting. 
72 At [116] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
73 See Ahsin, above n 1, at [253] per William Young J dissenting. 
74 Contrast R v Dooley, above n 54, at [123]. 
16 Executing a U-Turn: Withdrawal and Secondary Party Liability Following Ahsin v R 
majority’s explanation of the legal elements of s 66(1)(b),75 though there is doubt whether 
it is consistent with Larkins.  
 
Due to the interdependency of ‘actual assistance’ and the derivative link of s 66, the 
majority have also clarified or altered the derivative basis of liability to only require an 
associative link to the principal to derive liability (category 2), while suggesting that s 
66(1) does not stipulate a requirement of some connection to the offence itself (category 
3). Whether this is a clarification or alteration is unclear; no direct comparison was made 
from the requirement of actual assistance in Larkins to the discussion of actual assistance 
during the conceptualisation of withdrawal. The law on ‘actual assistance’ has likely been 
altered due to the contrasting authorities above, and the approach of the majority has been 
described as ‘novel’.76 A mere associative link would allow [conditional] liability to be 
complete when assistance is given. Withdrawal would be unable to negate the elements 
of the offence.  
3 Questioning an associative basis of derivative liability 
As a result of the alteration of ‘actual assistance’ the derivative basis s 66(1) rests on 
association (category 2); this needs to be questioned. Graham Virgo has proposed 
culpability by association for s 66(1)-type situations.77 He argues unlike causation or 
connection, association does not require establishing some effect on or link to the 
commission of the crime, as the focus is on the conduct of the secondary party solely and 
whether an association with the crime committed by the principal in some way can be 
established.78 None of the examples provided by Virgo of s 66(1)-type liability by 
association were where the secondary party provided assistance before the principal’s 
  
75 Ahsin, above n 1, at [83] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
76 Ahsin, above n 1, at [254] per William Young J dissenting. See also Don Stuart Canadian Criminal Law: 
A Treatise (6th ed, Carswell, Toronto, 2011) at 9, as cited in R v Gauthier 2013 SCC 32, 360 DLR (4th) 1 
at [95]. 
77 Virgo, above n 60. 
78 Virgo, above n 60, at 860; Herring, above n 70, at 904-908. 
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offence.79 Associative derivative liability in the context of s 66(1) has had little, if any 
express discussion in New Zealand.80  
 
The ability of assigning legal fault of the offence to an expired assistor or associate is 
unclear. In 1993, the United Kingdom Law Commission wrote a consultation paper 
advocating for an offence of attempting to assist that manifests a non-derivative basis of 
liability (category 1 above) to replace traditional secondary party liability.81 They 
considered an accessory’s legal fault was complete upon the act of assistance; the 
commission of the crime by the principal could not add or detract from that fault.82 
Similarly an associative basis of liability would regard legal fault as complete upon the 
act of assistance.83 The Law Commission did not consider however whether the 
secondary party’s assistance must have made some difference to the principal’s actions.84 
An associative basis of liability also does not require any contribution to the offence 
itself. Therefore whether an associative party should be treated as a secondary party, 
rather than an attempted assistor, is questionable 
 
An associative basis of liability blurs the line between a secondary party who actually 
assists, and someone who attempts to assist. Smith notes that a claim of no actus reus 
(negation of the elements of the offence) distinguishes derivative based liability from the 
inchoate offence of incitement85 because liability for inchoate offences attaches at the 
point of participation.86 An inchoate offender’s liability attaches instantaneously because 
it does not have to derive from any other party or action, which should set it apart from s 
66. However under an associative basis of s 66, [conditional] liability also attaches at the 
point of participation. Smith continues: “More generally, unlike incitement liability, 
complicity is conceptually grounded on the notion that the accessory’s actions carry at 
  
79 Virgo, above n 60, at 860-861. 
80 Comapre R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59. 
81 Law Commission, above n 48. 
82 Law Commission, above n 48, at [4.24]. 
83 Ahsin, above n 1, at [116] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
84 Smith, above n 40. 
85 Crimes Act, s 311(2). Contrast s 66(1)(d). 
86 Smith, above n 10. 
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least the potential to affect the principal’s behaviour (or consequences). Therefore 
encouragement or assistance must still exist at the time of the principal offence”87 A 
secondary party with only an associative link provides expired assistance that has no 
potential to affect the principal’s behaviour at the time of the offence. 
 
While the secondary party does not actually cause the harm, they have been 
linked to the harm element in the principal offence.88 Secondary participation requiring 
some connection is ‘harm-based’, while conviction for attempting to assist would confer a 
mere ‘harm-threatening system’.89 An associative basis of liability is also harm-
threatening; the assistance must be able assist an offence, but is not required to. Imposing 
liability on the harm-threatening secondary party equally with the principal’s harm-based 
conviction would seem unfair. In R v Stringer, the English Court of Appeal held the 
moral justification for holding the secondary party responsible for the offence is his 
involvement, which presupposes some connection between the secondary party’s actions 
and the offence.90 The connection provides the moral justification for liability. Merely 
requiring association to the principal fails to show the requisite moral culpability or 
responsibility for holding the secondary party liable for that specific crime. This is not to 
say someone who has provided expired assistance isn’t deserving of conviction at all, 
only that such persons should not be liable for the ‘substantive offence’ equal to the 
principal.91 Addressing culpability at the sentencing stage does not sufficiently reflect the 
lack of direct involvement in the offence, especially where mandatory sentences are 
imposed.92 As held in Dooley, “the aider or abetter’s liability is for the substantive crime 
and is not for some preparatory step toward the commission of that crime, there must be a 
connection between the alleged act of aiding or abetting and the actual commission of the 
crime.”93 People who take such preparatory steps, such as those who provide assistance 
  
87 Smith, above n 10, at 771, n 11. 
88 See Clarkson, Keating and Cunningham, above n 22, at 586. 
89 Smith, above n 40, at 244. 
90 Stringer, above n 52, at [48]. 
91 R v Dooley, above n 54, at [120]. 
92 See Crimes Act, s 172. 
93 R v Dooley, above n 54, at [120]. 
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that subsequently expires, are better treated as inchoate offenders and are not deserving of 
conviction equal to that of the principal.  
 
An associative offender under the majority’s approach, and an attempted assistor 
perform generally the same actions with the same legal fault,94 however conviction would 
fully depend on whether the principal commits the offence. There is some tension 
whether a party can be liable for attempting to assist under current law.95 If it were not an 
offence, under the majority’s approach a party attempting to assist, unlike an associative 
secondary party, would escape conviction where the principal does not commit the 
offence. Even if it were an offence, the sentence imposed on an attempted assistor would 
likely be considerably smaller than that of a secondary party.96 A possible solution may 
be to expand s 311(2) to include those who attempt to assist. This would capture all 
offenders performing conduct intending to assist in, or any preparatory steps towards an 
offence, including parties with an associative link.97  
4 Conclusions on associative liability and the definition of ‘actual assistance’ not 
needing to ‘remain operative’ 
The majority’s reasoning clarifies or alters actual assistance to allow the assistance to 
expire before the commission of the offence. Section 66(1) does not require the assistance 
to continue to or exist at the time of the offence. The majority only requires an 
association to the principal by actual assistance provided earlier (as described by 
category 2 above); a continuing connection in not necessary (as described by category 3).  
 
  
94 See Law Commission, above n 48, at [4.24]. 
95 See Garrow and Turkington, above 42, at [CRI66.10(i)] and [CRI70.2]; R v Bowern (1915) 34 NZLR 
696 (CA); Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (UK) s 1(4)(b); R v Dunnington [1984] QB 472; 1 All ER 676  
(CA); R v Kenning [2008] 2 Cr App R 32 (CA). Contrast Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law - 
Offences and Defences (online looseleaf ed, Brookers); Larkins above n 15; Drewery v Police (1988) 3 
CRNZ 499 (HC). 
96 See Crimes Act, s 311(1); Contrast s 172 and s 173. 
97 Contrast Criminal Attempts Act (UK), s 1(4)(b) 
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The UK Law Commission in their 2007 report considered a secondary party must in 
fact assist the principal at the time of the offence,98 which cannot be established until the 
offence is committed. Liability does not rest simply on the actions of the secondary party; 
it stems from the participation in the offence itself.99  Regarding the timing of liability, 
Card, Cross and Jones say that “[f]or [the secondary party] to be guilty as an 
accomplice…[his] conduct must (objectively) have constituted assistance or 
encouragement at the time of P’s act”.100 In this writer’s view of s 66(1) liability, actual 
assistance should be required to assist at the time of the offence. Actual assistance 
inherently requires a connection from the assistance to the offence. This provides 
sufficient responsibility for conviction of a substantive offence. A party that provides 
assistance that expires prior to the offence should only be liable for an attempt to assist, if 
such an offence exists.  
E Conceptualisation of Withdrawal: Requiring Actual Assistance under s 66(1)  
The clarification or alteration of ‘actual assistance’ by the majority allows the 
conclusion that the secondary party is unable to negate their participation. However due 
to the reasons outlined above, actual assistance should be read according to precedent and 
authority which would require some connection to the offence. Actions that prevent 
assistance provided by the secondary party to have ‘some effect’ at the time of the 
offence would prevent a finding of actual assistance. Withdrawal therefore would, and 
should be able to negate the elements of the offence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
98 Law Commission, above n 52, at 3.24. 
99 Simester and others, above n 49, at 213; Simester and Brookbanks, above n 10, at 6.4.2. 
100 Card, Cross and Jones, above n 48; Mendez above n 49. See also Ahsin above n 1, at [246] per Williams 
Young J. 
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IV Analysing the Elements of s 66(2) and their Effect on Withdrawal 
A Elements of s 66(2) Liability as Explained by the Majority and Minority  
Similar to s 66(1), the legal elements of s 66(2) will indicate the timing of secondary 
liability required to conceptualise withdrawal. Section 66(2) requires:101 
66 Parties to offences 
… 
(2) Where 2 or more persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful 
purpose, and to assist each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence 
committed by any one of them in the prosecution of the common purpose if the 
commission of that offence was known to be a probable consequence of the 
prosecution of the common purpose. 
The majority explained the five legal elements to establish liability under s 66(2).102 Two 
elements are important to conceptualising withdrawal, being the secondary party and the 
principal must form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose, and the 
principal offender must commit the offence in the prosecution of the common purpose.103  
1 The construction of liability by the majority 
The majority created a construction of s 66(2) liability during their discussion of 
withdrawal:104 
“…under s 66(2) the actus reus for party liability is complete at the time the 
defendant forms or joins a common purpose. Liability is then contingent only on 
commission of the offence by the principal offender in prosecution of that purpose.” 
As seen in the diagram below, the majority held that the secondary party’s actus reus (SP 
AR), or [conditional] liability is complete upon formation of the common purpose. 
Requiring the principal to commit the offence in prosecution of the common purpose was 
outside the secondary party’s actus reus. Liability is contingent on the principal offender 
(PO) committing the offence (PO AR) in prosecution of that purpose. There is no 
  
101 Crimes Act 1961, s 66(2). 
102 Ahsin, above n 1, at [102] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
103 At [102](b) and (d) per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
104 At [117] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
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opportunity of withdrawal between the formation of the common purpose and the offence 
by the principal. Withdrawal was considered an authentic defence to section 66(2).105 
Diagram of the majority’s construction of s 66(2) liability 
 
2 The construction of liability by the minority 
As seen in the diagram below, William Young J considered that “the prosecution 
must establish…that the offence in question was committed in…prosecution of that 
common purpose.”106 He required the common purpose to be current between the parties 
at the time of the offence.107 The elements of liability were not satisfied until the 
commission of the offence. This created a window of time between the creation of the 
common purpose and the principal’s offence in which the secondary party had the 
opportunity to terminate the common purpose by withdrawal.108 The principal would not 
be acting within a purpose that is common between the parties at the time the offence 
occurs. Withdrawal could negate the elements of the secondary party’s liability. 
 
  
105 At [117] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
106 Ahsin, above n 1, at [248] per William Young J dissenting. 
107 At [248] per William Young J dissenting. 
108 See Ahsin, above n ??, at [251] per William Young J dissenting. 
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Diagram of the minority’s construction of s 66(2) liability 
 
 
The aspect of s 66(2) that affects the timing of liability is the requirement the 
principal must commit the offence “in prosecution of the common purpose”;109 there is no 
clarity of this element in New Zealand case law.110 It is a legally relevant circumstance of 
the secondary party’s offence because it is a necessary condition or “essential element in 
making the conduct criminal”.111 If this circumstance can be negated by the secondary 
party’s actions, then the timing of liability will be at the time the offence is committed. In 
other words, the issue is whether departure from the common purpose by the secondary 
party prevents the principal from acting “in the prosecution of the common purpose”, 
thereby negating a required legal circumstance of the secondary party’s offence.112 
Whether the secondary party’s departure actually prevents the principal from acting 
within the common purpose depends on the definition of a ‘common purpose’. 
  
109 At [102](d) per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
110 Julia Tolmie “Uncertainty and Potential Overreach in New Zealand Common Purpose Doctrine” (2014) 
26 NZULR 441 at 459. 
111 Card, Cross and Jones, above n 48, at 2.19. See generally Clarkson, Keating and Cunningham, above n 
22, at 78; Simester and Brookbanks,  above n 10, at 3.1. 
112 Crimes Act, s 66(2). 
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B Defining “Common Purpose” in light of Ahsin v R 
1 The ‘common purpose’ legal element 
The common unlawful purpose has three general requirements. The unlawful purpose 
must be to commit a criminal offence.113 A formed purpose must be created, usually by 
inference from the conduct of the parties, though not necessarily.114 The purpose or 
intention must be ‘common’ between the parties.115    
2 The derivative nature of s 66(2) liability 
Similarly to s 66(1), the method of deriving liability under s 66(2) is interdependent to 
a legal element of the offence, which under this subsection is the requirement of the 
principal committing the offence in prosecution of the common purpose. This ensures the 
secondary party is in some way linked to the offence. The possible (non-exhaustive) 
derivative links manifested by a ‘common purpose’ under s 66(2) can be described as: 
• Category 1: [Conspiracy (non-derivative/inchoate) being an agreement between 
two or more people to commit an offence. No actual offence is committed, 
however an association with another party is inherently required by the 
agreement.]116 
• Category 2: Association of the secondary party to the principal by the formation 
of the common purpose. The principal commits an offence in prosecution of the 
purpose that may not be common at the time of the offence. [It is irrelevant 
whether the secondary party is still party to the common purpose.] 
• Category 3: Some connection to the offence by the secondary party by continuing 
involvement in the common purpose when the offence is committed. The 
principal commits the offence with the added presence and support of the 
secondary party.117 
  
113 Iti v R [2012] NZCA 492 at [95]; R v Currie [1969] NZLR 193 (CA). 
114 R v Fa’apusa above n 93, R v Chen [2009] NZCA 445, [2010] 2 NZLR 158. 
115 R v Curtis [1988] 1 NZLR 734 (CA), R v Vaihu [2009] NZCA 111.  
116 Crimes Act, s 310. 
117 See R v Rajakumar (Aathavan) [2013] EWCA Crim 1512, [2014] 1 Cr. App. R. 12; R v Smith (Dean 
Martin) [2008] EWCA Crim 1342, [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. 36. See also R v O’Flaherty [2004] EWCA Crim 
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The majority held that the principal must commit the offence in prosecution of a purpose 
that was common earlier, but is not necessarily common between the parties when the 
offence occurs.118 Similar to s 66(1), the majority’s reasoning would therefore suggest the 
ability to derive liability comes from an association to the principal prior to the offence, 
yet that association is able to expire (synonymous with category 2). There is no 
connection, direct or indirect, from the secondary party to that offence at the time that 
offence occurs if the purpose is not required to be common between the parties. The 
principal who is no longer acting in concert under a common purpose with the secondary 
party is not receiving any added support.119 The minority consider the purpose is required 
to be common or current between the parties at the time of the offence.120 The ability to 
derive liability comes from some connection under category 3, albeit indirect, from the 
secondary party to the offence, manifested through his continued involvement in pursuing 
the common purpose. 
3 Objections against the majority’s approach  
Some objections can be made where the common purpose is not required to be 
current between the parties. The length of time to which the secondary party will be liable 
for the actions of principal if he continues to act within that purpose would, at least 
theoretically, be unlimited. In R v Chen, the accused was alleged to be party to a common 
intention to import and sell drugs.121 Mr Chen, despite being involved in earlier 
shipments, alleged he had no involvement in subsequent shipments. Under the approach 
of the majority, the accused would be liable indefinitely as long as the principals were 
importing and selling drugs in accordance with that earlier agreed to purpose, despite 
having no continued involvement at all in those shipments. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
526, [2004] 2 Cr App R 20; R v Mitchell [2008] EWCA Crim 2552; [2009] 1 Cr App R 31; Andrew 
Ashworth “Joint enterprise: murder - whether two distinct joint enterprises” (2009) 4 Crim LR 287 at 288. 
118 See Ahsin, above n 1, at [117] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ and [220](b), n 156, per 
William Young J. 
119 At [102](c) per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
120 At [248] per William Young J dissenting. 
121 Chen, above n 114, at [56].  
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The justification of s 66(2) liability arises from the secondary party’s participation in 
the common purpose,122 and acceptance that offences other than the intended purpose 
could be committed in prosecution of that purpose.123 The formation of the common 
purpose is the only act they perform towards any crime that provides sufficient moral 
culpability to justify conviction under s 66(2).124 If the common purpose was allowed to 
lapse, the formation of the common purpose is not linked in any way with the offence 
when it is committed. Secondary liability should also be viewed on the responsibility 
attached to the action of forming a common unlawful purpose.125 However where that 
purpose no longer has to be current, the responsibility that can be assigned to the 
formation of the common purpose is minimal as a common purpose would no longer be 
the motivation for the offence. The crime would be committed purely on the principal’s 
desire to commit the offence because the destruction of a common purpose by withdrawal 
would usually have to be effected through communication.126  
 
A secondary party’s moral culpability or responsibility, where the common purpose 
does not have to be current at the time the offence, is similar to that of a conspirator. The 
actus reus under s 66(2) stated by the majority is the forming of the common purpose, 
while the actus reus for conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal conduct, both 
which are an agreement to pursue an offence.127 Regarding mens rea, conspiracy requires 
both an intention to agree and an intention to pursue the requisite course of conduct.128  
The mens rea required for s 66(2) is the knowledge of the essential facts of the offence, 
along with either an intention for the unlawful purpose to be carried out or at least 
knowledge the offence committed was a probable consequence of pursuing the common 
  
122 Tolmie, above n 110, at 451. 
123 Simester, above n 58, at 599. 
124 Tolmie, above n 110, at 450. 
125 Simester, above n 58, at 600. 
126 Ahsin, above n 1, at [249] per William Young J dissenting. 
127 See Ahsin, above n 1, at [102] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ; Simester and Brookbanks 
above n 10, at 8.3.4; R v Gemmell [1985] 2 NZLR 740 (CA), at 743.  
128 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 10, at 8.3.5. See also R v Gemmell, above n 127, at 743 
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purpose.129 Hence, both conspiracy and s 66(2) require a type of intention to commit an 
offence in the future, however someone who has the mens rea of conspiracy is likely to 
be more culpable that someone with the mens rea for s 66(2) because under the latter, the 
secondary party does not necessarily need to intend the offence that occurs.  Hence when 
the actus reus and the mens rea are assessed together, the moral culpability of two people, 
one forming a common unlawful purpose under s 66(2), and one joining a conspiracy 
under s 310 are comparable at a minimum, or possibly an offender under s 66(2) is less 
culpable. However conviction under s 66(2) would arise where a party other than the 
accused has committed an offence, meanwhile conspiracy would require no offence at all; 
liability would fully depend on the actions of a third party. Perhaps those people who 
form a common purpose, yet depart from that purpose, should fall under s 310 rather than 
s 66 because the difference of conviction rests not in the actions of the accused, but in the 
actions of a third party. Despite this similarity, there is a disparity in respective penalties. 
Section 66(2) imposes the substantive offence and relevant sentence, while conspiracy 
would attract a maximum of 7 years (or less depending on the offence).130 This disparity 
is justified if the secondary party’s continued involvement is required, which is of higher 
moral culpability and responsibility than that of conspiracy, as the secondary party is 
participating and continuing to endorse the circumstances that give rise to the actual 
commission of the offence. However such involvement is not necessary where the 
common purpose does not have to be current, and therefore conviction on that basis has 
reduced justification. 
 
Liability for the secondary party should not attach where the principal departed from 
the common purpose, but also where there was abandonment of the common purpose by 
the secondary party.131  However under the majority’s approach, a disparity exists 
between the effectiveness of principal’s actions and the secondary party’s actions. The 
principal can negate the secondary party’s mens rea by committing an offence unforeseen 
  
129 See Ahsin, above n ?, at [102](e) per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ; R v Gemmell, above n 127, 
at 743. Tolmie, above n 110, at 453, n 64.  
130 Crimes Act, s310. 
131 V Gordon Rose Parties to an Offence (The Carswell Company, Toronto, 1982), at 73. 
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by the secondary party as being a probable consequence of the common purpose,132 and 
can prevent liability attaching to the secondary party if, by the principal’s departure from 
the common intention, the offence was not committed “in prosecution of the common 
purpose”.133 Meanwhile, the secondary party cannot negate their actus reus by removing 
himself from common purpose.134 This may be justified as the secondary party accepts 
liability for all the offences committed in prosecution of that purpose by joining the 
purpose.135 But this would be contrary to our inherent human nature to change our 
mind.136 The secondary party relinquishes control to the principal party by joining the 
common purpose; by requiring the purpose to be current the secondary party is able to 
retrieve that control. The appropriate level of culpability of someone who opens 
themselves up to liability by the actions of others by agreeing to commit an offence, 
however changes their mind by ceasing involvement, is probably better characterised as 
inchoate offending such as conspiracy, and not as being a secondary party to a 
substantive offence.  
4 Adoption of the minority’s approach 
The minority has the view that something should be required at the time of the 
offence to show the secondary party’s continued involvement (category 3 above). 
William Young J noted that the New Zealand approach has been that the purpose had to 
be to have been current at the time of the offence.137 While the law on secondary party 
liability in this context is slightly different in the United Kingdom, the law is consistent 
with the minority’s approach that some type of continued participation in the joint 
  
132 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 10, at 6.5.3(1); Smith, above n 10, at 771; Ahsin, above n 1, at [117], 
n 79.  
133 Ahsin, above n 1, at [117], n 79 per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ; Simester and Brookbanks, 
above n 10, at 6.5.3(1). 
134 At [117] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
135 Simester, above n 58, at 599 
136 See generally Sanford H Kadish “Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of 
Doctrine” 73 Cal L Rev 324 (1985). 
137 Ahsin, above n 1, at [249] per William Young J dissenting; R v Vaihu, above n 115, at [97]; See R v 
Chen, above n 114, at [56], see also [29] and [38](e); R v Te Moni [1998] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) at 651; Baird v 
R [2012] NZCA 430 at [23]; Robertson, above n 95, at CA66.26. 
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enterprise or common purpose is required.138 This approach would provide sufficient 
moral justification for conviction of a substantive offence under s 66(2).  
C Conceptualisation of Withdrawal: the Offence to be committed “in prosecution of 
the common purpose” under s 66(2)  
The secondary party should have to continue their participation in the common 
purpose, which can be determined by assessing the common purpose and finding whether 
they have withdrawn from that purpose.139 A withdrawal by termination of involvement 
would therefore simply show the destruction of the common purpose so no common 
purpose is present when the principal commits the offence. In line with the minority’s 
approach, Simester and Brookbanks commenting on withdrawal under s 66(2) suggest 
“[i]n principle, the joint enterprise could itself simply co me to an end.”140 Such a view is 
preferable, and therefore withdrawal of a secondary party would be able to negate the 
elements of s 66(2).141 
 
V Jurisdictional Comparisons and Dual ‘Defences’ of Withdrawal 
A common law authentic defence of withdrawal has only been established in one 
other jurisdiction by the Canadian case of R v Gauthier; however the majority in that case 
provided no analysis why an authentic defence should be adopted.142  New Zealand is 
unique for providing a justification for a common law defence of withdrawal. Some 
jurisdictions have enacted a statutory provision within their secondary party provision, 
separate from general defences, to allow for termination of involvement by withdrawal.143 
  
138 See R v Rajakumar (Aathavan), above n 117; R v Smith (Dean Martin) above n 117. See also R v 
O’Flaherty, above n 117; R v Mitchell, above n 117; Ashworth, above n 117, at 288. R v Rahman (Islamur) 
[2008] UKHL 45; [2009] 1 AC 129. 
139 R v Mitchell, above n 117, at [25]. 
140 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 10, at 6.6.6(1). See also R v Campbell (Andre), above n 117.  
141 Ahsin, above n 1, at [248] per William Young J dissenting. 
142 Gauthier, above n 76, at [50] and see generally [35]-[52]. Contrast [94] per Fish J dissenting. 
143 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 11.2(4), s 11.2A(6); Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 45(5), s 45A(6); 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324(2), s 324C note; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA)(CI) s 8(2); 
American Law Institute Model Penal Code (American Law Institute, Philadelphia, 1962) § 2.06(6). 
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Some courts provide ambiguous descriptions of withdrawal,144 and some have indicated 
that withdrawal can simply negate the elements of the offence.145 
 
An authentic defence may still be available, even where withdrawal is able to negate 
the elements of the offence. The majority in Ahsin holds that the key inculpatory moment 
of a secondary party, who provides assistance that subsequently expires, is at the act of 
assistance, hence withdrawal operating as an authentic defence will occur after the 
completed actus reus.146 Contrastingly, Smith regards the actus reus as incomplete, or 
merely having the ‘potential’ to be the actus reus until it is shown that the assistance in 
fact assisted at the time of the offence, after which it becomes the complete actus reus of 
the offence.147 Where given assistance is subsequently undone by the secondary party by 
withdrawal, the secondary party cannot be liable as “the actus reus of complicity was 
absent at the crucial time.”148 An authentic defence of withdrawal is therefore premised 
on the elements of secondary liability being satisfied (or complete) at the “key 
inculpatory moment”, being when the principal offence was committed.149 In other words, 
an authentic defence would apply where the elements of secondary liability were satisfied 
at the time of the offence; acts of withdrawal would occur “after the accessory’s 
commission of the incomplete or potential actus reus.”150 An authentic defence of 
withdrawal could therefore operate even where the elements of liability are satisfied, and 
therefore where acts of withdrawal could negate the elements of liability but do not.151 
 
This idea of adopting dual ‘defences’ could be a possible solution to the operation of 
withdrawal, however this would increase the complexity of jury instructions and would 
broaden the availability of exculpation by withdrawal. An underlying concern of the 
  
144 R v Becerra (1976) 62 Cr App R 212 (CA); R v Rook [1993] EWCA Crim 3; [1993] 2 All ER 955; R v 
Whitehouse [1941] 1 WWR 112; [1941] 1 DLR 683 (BCCA). 
145 O’Flaherty, above n 117. R v Mitchell, above n 117; R v Rajakumar (Aathavan), above n 117, at [42]. 
146 Ahsin, above n 1, at [116] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
147 Smith, above n 10, at 771-772 
148 At 771. 
149 At 772. 
150 At 772. 
151 David Lanham “Accomplices and Withdrawal” (1981) 97 LQR 575; Smith, above n 10. Also cited in 
Ahsin, above n 1, at [115], n 77, per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ;  
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majority may have been in some circumstances it is impossible for an individual to 
negate participation in an offence, however those individuals should still be exculpated if 
they perform certain actions. This can be achieved through an authentic defence as its 
requirements can be adapted and changed, unlike the view of the minority where only 
acts that fully neutralise prior participation will exculpate the individual.  
 
The majority considered policy reasons in favour of a true defence. An authentic 
defence can reflect the aims and rationales of the defence’s existence,152 it would avoid 
complex jury directions where both s 66(1) and (2) are relied upon,153 and places the 
evidentiary burden on the accused.154 Conversely the minority seem to place weight on 
consistency with the scheme provided in the Crimes Act155 and the accepted approach to 
s 66 in New Zealand.156 However, William Young J considered that an authentic defence 
was not available under s 20 of the Crimes Act,157 and commented on the majority’s 
approach saying it; “leaves rather more scope than I would for withdrawal arguments in 
relation to liability under s 66(1)(b).”158  
The minority’s approach to secondary party liability is arguably more consistent with 
the law held in New Zealand and other jurisdictions on secondary party liability. Such a 
view, when analysed through the lens of the timing of liability adopted by both the 
majority and minority, conceptualises withdrawal as being able to negate the elements of 
the offence and therefore should be the bottom line approach to withdrawal. The 
appropriateness of an authentic defence of withdrawal and consistency with s 20 of the 
Crimes Act are separate issues that need to be explored.159  
 
  
152 See Ahsin, above n 1, at [122]-[123] and [124]-[142] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
153 Ahsin, above n 1, at [119] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
154 At [120] per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
155 At [21] per Elias CJ dissenting. 
156 At [246] and [249] per William Young J dissenting. 
157 At [255]-[269] per William Young J dissenting. 
158 At [252] per William Young J dissenting. 
159 See Ahsin, above n 1, at [254] per William Young J dissenting. 
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VI   Conclusion 
Under s 66(1), the majority’s reasoning clarifies, though more likely alters actual 
assistance to be able to satisfy the actus reus of s 66(1) prior to the principal’s offence 
being committed. The derivative basis of secondary liability would rest on association to 
the principal, instead of some connection to the offence. This is directly contrary to the 
precedent and authority on ‘actual assistance’. There are a number of reasons outlined 
that would suggest this approach is not best suited for s 66. The minority’s construction 
of liability, featuring actual assistance that requires a connection to the offence should be 
adopted. Withdrawal should be able to negate the elements of s 66(1). 
 
Under s 66(2), the majority’s reasoning clarifies, though more likely alters s 66(2) to 
not require the common purpose to be current at the time the offence is committed by the 
principal. Similarly to s 66(1), this would also clarify or alter the derivative nature of 
liability to lack a link to the offence at the time the offence occurs. Withdrawal would be 
unable to negate the elements of the offence. However in line with the minority, and 
accepted precedent and authority, the common purpose should be required to remain 
current between the principal and the secondary party at the time the offence occurs. A 
secondary party can withdraw by removing themselves from that common purpose which 
negates an element of the offence. 
 
Under the majority’s reasoning, both s 66 (1) and (2) are based on a type of 
associative link, which has had little, if any discussion as a possible basis for establishing 
secondary liability in New Zealand. The moral justification or degree of responsibility the 
secondary party has through his actions would be diminished by not requiring any direct 
participation in the offence itself under s 66(1), or any continued endorsement of the 
circumstances in which the offence occurred under s 66(2). The ability to link the 
participation to the harm of the primary offence in any way is compromised. The moral 
culpability and responsibility attributed to the participation in the reasoning of the 
majority is similar, if not the same as the conduct required for inchoate liability. 
However, there is a disparity in respective penalties. A solution could be to expand s 
311(2) to cover situations anticipated by the majority’s construction of s 66(1)(b) 
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liability. The offence of conspiracy may adequately cover the circumstances 
contemplated by the majority’s construction of s 66(2) liability. 
 
Simester notes “complicity liability is notoriously difficult, both doctrinally and 
conceptually, in part because its underlying principles are themselves in tension.”160 
These principles are the major conflicts that develop during the conceptualisation of 
withdrawal in Ahsin. Only with clearer explanations of the principle of derivative liability 
and how it is manifested in the elements of s 66 could withdrawal be definitively 
conceptualised as being able (or not able) to negate the elements of the offence. 
 
The majority’s clarification or alteration of the legal elements of s 66 and the way 
they operate to derive liability seem to be undesirable in view of basic principles of 
criminal law, and inconsistent with the authorities cited in this paper. The object of the 
majority’s description of s 66 liability may have been to find that withdrawal was unable 
to negate the elements of the offence; potential policy reasons regarding the rationales 
and practical implications of withdrawal may have overridden the need for consistency of 
the law surrounding secondary liability.161 Hence, denying that acts of withdrawal could, 
or should be able to negate the elements of s 66 is questionable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
160 Simester, above n 49, at 600. 
161 Ahsin, above n 1, at [120]-[121], per McGrath, Glazebrook and Tipping JJ. 
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